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4  Validation of the Regional Authority Index 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to validate the Regional Authority Index. One could 
distinguish between two reasons for assessing (internal) validity of measurements. 
First, by validating measurements, commonalities come to the fore. In how far do 
the measures measure the same? This is how assessing (internal) validity is usually 
understood. Another reason, however, may lie in exploring differences between 
measurements. When do measures of the same concept disagree? The answer to this 
question reveals information which might be helpful in deciding when or how to use 
one or the other measurement. In this chapter the validity of the Regional Authority 
Index is assessed by looking at the commonalities as well as the differences between 
the Regional Authority Index and other, widely used, regionalization and 
decentralization indices. 
Three types of indices exist: indices measuring institutional decentralization/ 
regionalization, indices of fiscal decentralization/regionalization or indices that 
combine institutional and fiscal components. Institutional indices have been 
developed by Mohammad Arzaghi and J. Vernon Henderson (2005), Dawn Brancati 
(2006), Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2001), Jan–Erik Lane and Svante Ersson 
(1999), Arend Lijphart (1999) and Daniel Treisman (2002). Fiscal indices have been 
introduced by Dietmar Braun (2000), Frank Castles (1999), Dan Stegarescu (2005a), 
Jean–Philippe Meloche, François Vaillancourt and Serdar Yilmaz (2004), Robert 
Ebel and Serdar Yilmaz (2002), Ruben Enikolopov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya 
(2007), and Wallace Oates (1972). Some authors combine the two types into one 
index, as does Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge (2002).  
Despite the abundance of indices, there is little systematic comparison of their 
validity (an important exception is Rodden (2004)). This chapter focuses on two 
types of validity (Ray 2007; Bollen 1989)1:  
 
• Convergent validity assesses whether a given indicator is empirically 
associated with other indicators that conform to theoretical expectations: it 
involves comparing alternative measures of the same concept or comparing 
measures of different concepts (Ray 2007: 12). Measurements of the same 
concept, in our case, decentralization, should converge, that is, they should 
correlate across a given set of cases.  
• Content validity assesses the degree to which an indicator captures the 
content of the measured concept (Adcock and Collier 2001: 537). This is a 
“qualitative type of validity where the domain of the concept is made clear 
                                                 
1 Bollen (1989) and Ray (2007) distinguish between four types of validity. In addition to the two 
mentioned types of validity they identify criterion validity and construct validity. Criterion validity 
“involves the comparison of a measure with some other generally accepted measure of the same concept” 
(Ray 2007: 12). A given measure is compared to a  ‘golden standard’. Since there is no ‘golden standard’ 
for decentralization, criterion validity cannot be assessed. Construct validity “assesses whether a measure 
relates to other observed variables in a way that is consistent with theoretically derived predictions” 
(Bollen 1989: 188). Construct validity is not assessed because theoretically derived predictions relating to 
the effects of regionalization and decentralization are imprecise.  
Chapter 4: Validation of the Regional Authority Index 
 
 
 53
and the analyst judges whether the measures fully represent the domain” 
(Bollen 1989: 185). Testing for content validity “does not involve the 
comparison of a measure with any other quantitative data, and can be 
employed even before any data is collected” (Ray 2007: 12). Content 
validity means that scholars agree on the definition of decentralization, or 
agree on how decentralization can be broken down into different types of 
decentralization. The measurements may differ in their ‘content’ because 
different theoretical assumptions underly them. 
 
I assess convergent validity for the Regional Authority Index by comparing the 
index with seven institutional–type regionalization and decentralization indices 
commonly used in the literature. I do not use fiscal indices to examine convergent 
validity of the Regional Authority Index because there are major caveats with 
respect to content validity. I point out two caveats with conceptualizing and 
operationalizing fiscal decentralization.  
In the next section, I introduce and compare seven institutional measures. Can 
decentralization be conceived as a single, continuous dimension? What is the 
common structure underlying these measures? I then test several hypotheses for 
explaining variation among the different measures, and I analyze the strongest cases 
of disagreement in greater detail. In the last section, I examine the content validity of 
fiscal indicators of decentralization. 
 
 
4.2  Decentralization indices 
  
I conceive of decentralization as a single, continuous dimension ranging from 
centralization in which the central government monopolizes decision–making 
authority to decentralization in which subnational governments have extensive 
decision–making authority that falls short of a monopoly over authority. It is 
important to note that this is a simplification. Some authors differentiate among 
vertical vs. horizontal decentralization, or decentralization with respect to decision–
making, appointment, electoral, fiscal or personnel (Treisman 2002), or between 
fiscal, political and administrative decentralization (Schneider 2003). 
The Regional Authority Index is consistent with these understandings in that it 
too is composed of different components: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal 
autonomy, representation, and law making, executive control, fiscal control and 
constitutional reform. However, the Regional Authority Index differs from some 
(but not all) indices in that it focuses on regional tiers, i.e. the intermediate tiers with 
a minimum average jurisdictional population size of 150,000. Several 
decentralization indices that I discuss here consider the dispersion of power across 
all subnational tiers, thus including the local tier, and sometimes they also include 
dispersion of power to interests groups (i.e. corporatism). 
I compare the Regional Authority Index with the following indices:  
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Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)2 
These authors present a “nuanced index of ‘institutional’ decentralization, or 
effective federalism” (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005: 1176) which they construct by 
assessing fiscal, political, and administrative responsibilities of subnational 
government. This index is an average of six indicators, each of which ranges from 0 
to 4: 
• Unitary (0) or federal (4) government structure;  
• Election of a regional executive: no (0) or yes (4); 
• Election of a local executive: no (0) or yes (4); 
• Ability of the center to suspend lower levels of government or to override 
their decisions: no (4) or yes (0);  
• Revenue raising authority of lower level governments: no (0), limited (2) or 
full (4); 
• Revenue sharing: no (0), limited (2) or full (4). 
The dataset consists of scores for five–year intervals between 1960–1995 for 16 
European and OECD countries that overlap with the Regional Authority Index 
dataset.3 
 
 
Brancati (2006) 
This index measures political decentralization, which is understood as the vertical 
division of authority among subnational levels of government that have independent 
decision–making power over at least one issue area. 
The index consists of three components, which together construct a scale 
ranging from 0 to 5: 
• Subnational elections: 1 point when there are subnational elections; 
• Subnational legislative control over policies: 1 point each for tax authority, 
education and public order/police; 
• Subnational veto over constitutional amendments: 1. 
The dataset consists of 40 European, Balkan and OECD countries4, for the years 
1985–2000.5  
 
 
                                                 
2 The dataset, from which the Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) scores are derived, was kindly provided by 
Christine A. Kearney. 
3 Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the USA. 
4 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, and the USA. 
5 Seventeen country scores were provided by Brancati (2006) herself (i.e. Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States). Twenty–three countries were 
scored by the author on the basis of information provided by Brancati in personal communication. 
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Hooghe and Marks (2001) 
The Hooghe and Marks index is the only of seven which focuses on regional 
autonomy—rather than decentralization—within a country. This is an additive index 
of four components, ranging between 0 and 12: 
• Constitutional federalism (0–4), which taps constitutional or legal 
provisions relating to regional government in the state. One point is 
assigned for each of the following characteristics (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 
194): 
 Existence of a functioning regional tier of government; 
 Extensive authoritative competencies, including control over two or 
more of the following: taxation; police; education policy (including 
tertiary education); cultural policy; transport and communications policy; 
economic development; local government; and determination of regional 
political institutions (e.g., administrative hiring, budget process, timing of 
regional elections); 
 Specific regional competencies that are constitutionally guaranteed; 
 A federal state in which constitutional change is co–decided by the 
central state and regions. 
• Special territorial autonomy (0–2), which refers to constitutional or legal 
provisions for home rule in special territories. The score is derived by 
multiplying the score for the extent of authoritative competencies in a 
special territory with a score that varies by the relative population size of 
the special territory, so that larger special territories weigh more heavily on 
the country score (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 200): 
 Scope of competencies:  
 0.5 = weak competencies;  
 1 = extensive competencies (see the list above). 
 Population coverage: 
 1 = less than 10 percent of the population;  
 2 = more than 10 percent of the population. 
• Role of regions in central government (0–4), whereby the authors 
distinguish between legislative and executive power sharing: 
 Legislative power sharing, if there is a chamber in the national 
legislature composed of representatives of regional governments or 
parliaments: 
 0 = no chamber in the national legislature composed of 
representatives of regional governments or parliaments; 
 1 = chamber without wide–ranging veto power;  
 2 = chamber with wide–ranging veto power. 
 Executive power sharing: 
 0 = no regular intergovernmental meetings between central state and 
regional executives; 
 1 = regular meetings without authority to reach binding decisions;  
 2 = regular meetings with authority to reach binding decisions. 
• Regional elections (0–2): 
 1 = the regional assembly is indirectly elected; 
 2 = the regional assembly is directly elected. 
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The dataset covers 14 West–European countries6, with for each country four 
time–points of evaluation: 1950, 1970, 1990 and 2000. 
 
 
Lane and Ersson (1999) 
This is an index of decentralization which is understood as “the territorial location of 
public decision and implementation functions at various levels of government” 
(Lane and Ersson 1999: 207).  
The index consists of four discrete components for a total of 10 points: 
• Extent of federalism (0–3); 
• Special territorial autonomy (0–2); 
• Functional autonomy (0–2); 
• Local government discretion (0–3). 
The dataset contains scores for 18 West–European countries7, and has one data 
point capturing decentralization in the post–Second World War period8. 
 
 
Lijphart (1999) 
Lijphart measures federalism and decentralization which he conceives as one 
dimension. The index consists of five ordinal categories which construe a scale that 
ranges from 1 to 5: 
• 1 = unitary and centralized; 
• 2 = unitary and decentralized; 
• 3 = semi–federal; 
• 4 = federal and centralized; 
• 5 = federal and decentralized. 
This dataset consists of 36 countries, of which 24 West–European and OECD 
countries overlap with the Regional Authority Index.9 There is one score which is an 
average evaluation of the post–Second World War period.10 
 
 
Treisman (2002) 
Treisman focuses on decentralization, and he measures different types: vertical, 
decision–making, appointment, electoral, fiscal and personnel decentralization.11 
                                                 
6 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
7 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
8 The authors do not refer to a precise time point but since their book concerns the 1945─1995 period it is 
reasonable to assume that they consider scores to be an average for this time period.  
9 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and the USA.  
10 Lijphart (1999) presents average scores for the years 1945 to 1996. 
11 Vertical decentralization is operationalized as the number of tiers in a country (Treisman 2002: 5 and 
14). The Pearson correlation with the Regional Authority Index is 0.546 (p < 0.01; N = 38). Appointment 
decentralization is conceptualized as the extent to which executive appointments are made by actors at the 
same (or lower) tier, rather than from above (“for each appointment that was made by an actor at a higher 
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Decision–making decentralization comes closest to the definition of decentralization 
used in this chapter, and I therefore use it to validate the Regional Authority Index. 
An index of decision–making decentralization can be made by summing three 
components of decentralization identified by Treisman, which creates a scale 
ranging from 0 to 312: 
• Weak autonomy = 1: the constitution reserves to subnational 
legislatures the exclusive right to legislate on at least one specific 
policy area or if subnational legislatures have residual authority; 
• Residual autonomy = 1: the constitution gives subnational legislatures 
the exclusive right to legislate on policy areas not specifically assigned 
in the constitution; 
• Subnational veto = 1: there is a regionally–elected upper chamber that 
has the constitutional right to block legislation. 
The dataset covers 41 European, Balkan and OECD–countries13, and the scores 
reflect the situation in the mid–1990s. 
 
 
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) 
Their autonomy index measures “how independent the non–central units of 
government are as regards policy making” (Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 2000: 
35). The autonomy index consists of four components, which combine in a scale 
from 0 to 8. 
 
                                                                                                                   
tier, one point is assigned for each tier that the appointer was above the appointee” Treisman 2002: 17). 
Electoral decentralization is operationalized as the extent to which subnational officials are elected 
(“percentage of subnational tiers at which the executive was chosen by direct election or selected by a 
directly elected legislature” Treisman 2002: 18). Appointment and electoral decentralization appear to 
have affinity with the representation dimension of the Regional Authority Index, i.e. executive and 
assembly, respectively. The Pearson correlations are low: –0.144 (not significant; N = 38), respectively 
0.215 (not significant; N = 39). Fiscal decentralization is the share of subnational government in total tax 
revenues or the share of subnational government in public expenditures. Both are fiscal indicators, and as 
I argue below, they raise important concept validity concerns. Personnel decentralization is the share of 
subnational governments in total government administration employees (Treisman 2002: 19). The 
Pearson correlation between this indicator and the Regional Authority Index is 0.562 (p < 0.01; N = 32). 
12 The decision to sum three types of decision making decentralization is mine. Treisman is reluctant to 
combine the various measures of decentralization into a single index. For example, he notes that “the 
right of subnational actors to interfere in central legislative decisions will not necessarily coincide with 
their autonomy from central interference, so it makes more sense to use [the] different types of indicators 
separately than to combine them” (2002: 9–10). This is a defensible position, theoretically or empirically, 
it is perfectly possible that these different decentralization rights not coincide. The starting point in this 
chapter, and in the dissertation as a whole, is that decentralization is a multifaceted phenomenon which is 
best captured by combining measures of diverse components. The Regional Authority Index introduced in 
this dissertation differentiates between self–rule and shared rule, and these concepts resemble Treisman’s 
notions of subnational autonomy from central interference and subnational actors right to interfere in 
central legislative decisions respectively. Just as the Regional Authority Index is a summation of self–rule 
and shared rule, it seems sensible to combine the two indicators of decision–making decentralization into 
a single measure. 
13 Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, and the USA.  
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• Central fiscalization (0–2)14: 
2: if a country has a degree of fiscal centralization lower than 75%; 
1: if a country has a degree of fiscal centralization between 75% and 90%; 
0: if a country has a degree of fiscal centralization equal to or more than 
90%. 
• Regional autonomy (0–2): 
2: if regional autonomy is formally laid down (as is the case in federalist 
states); 
1: if the country is a semi–federalist system; 
0: neither. 
• Centralization (0–2): 
2: if the state is not considered to be centralized; 
1: is the state is considered to be medium centralized; 
0: if the state is considered to be highly centralized. 
• Local government autonomy (0–2): 
2: if three conditions are met: local government is mentioned in the 
constitution, its autonomy is recognized, and it is guaranteed own 
representation; 
1: if one of these conditions is met; 
0: all other cases. 
The dataset contains 37 European, Balkan and OECD–countries15, and there is 
one time–point of evaluation which reflects the post–Second World War period.16  
 
 
4.3  Factor analysis 
 
To see whether these diverse measures of a single concept—decentralization—have 
a common structure, a principal axis analysis is employed (Marks, Hooghe, 
Steenbergen and Bakker 2007).17 Since the number of countries for which we have 
scores differs per decentralization index, I perform four separate factor analyses so 
that I can maximize the number of cases.  
The factor analyses in table 4.1 reveal that the indices do indeed have a common 
structure. In each analysis, the principal axis has an eigenvalue well above one, and 
the explained variance is 75% or more. The Regional Authority Index measure loads 
strongly on the principal axis in all four analyses. Lijphart’s and Hooghe and 
Marks’, and to a lesser extent Brancati’s and Treisman’s measure also load heavily 
on the principal axis. 
                                                 
14 The operationalization of central fiscalization diverges somewhat from the one published in 
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000). The adjustments were made after communication with Hans 
Keman and Jaap Woldendorp. 
15 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the USA. 
16 The authors do not specify a particular time point, but since their book covers the 1945–1998 time span 
it seems reasonable to assume that their scores average the situation for the duration of this time period. 
17 The Pearson correlations between the decentralization indexes are given in appendix 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Factor analyses of seven decentralization indices and the Regional 
Authority Index 
Decentralization index Factor 
analysis I 
Factor 
analysis II 
Factor 
analysis III 
Factor 
analysis IV 
Regional Authority Index 0.996 0.934 0.920 0.910 
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) 0.748 ─ ─ ─ 
Brancati (2006) 0.771 0.840 0.917 0.906 
Hooghe and Marks (2001) 0.945 0.924 ─ ─ 
Lane and Ersson (1999) 0.809 0.740 ─ ─ 
Lijphart (1999) 0.894 0.923 0.931 ─ 
Treisman (2002) 0.824 0.884 0.869 0.906 
Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 
(2000) 
0.920 0.789 0.874 0.866 
N 7 14 23 36 
Eigenvalue 6.017 5.232 4.072 3.209 
Explained Variance 75% 75% 81% 80% 
Notes: All indices are standardized. Shown are the factor loadings resulting from a principal axis analysis. The 
following time periods are compared with each other: Regional Authority Index (average for 1950–2006); 
Arzaghi and Henderson (average score of eight, five–year intervals between 1960–1995); Brancati (one score 
for 1985–2000); Hooghe and Marks (average of four time points: 1950, 1970, 1990, 2000); Lane and Ersson 
(one score for 1945–1995); Lijphart (one score for 1945–1996); Treisman (one score for the mid–1990s); 
Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (one score for 1945–1998). 
 
 
4.4  Sources and cases of disagreement 
 
In this section, I explore the sources of disagreement between the decentralization 
indexes and I pay close attention to the most important cases of disagreement.  
The decentralization indices can be considered as expert judgments. As can be 
seen from the description of the indices, each expert uses her/his own criteria. 
Although there are commonalities in these criteria, there are also many differences. 
Furthermore, experts differ in their level of knowledge for different countries. One 
may hypothesize that this all leads to different evaluations of subnational autonomy 
in countries.  
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4.4.1  Sources of disagreement 
 
To explore the structure of disagreement between the Regional Authority Index and 
the other measures, the Regional Authority Index is regressed on each 
decentralization index.18 By exploring the residuals from regressing the Regional 
Authority Index on one of the other decentralization indices one can see when the 
measures disagree. I am interested in systematic sources of bias or error—not in 
random error. Where can we expect to observe larger residuals, that is to say, where 
can we expect the scores of the Regional Authority Index to differ systematically 
from one of the other indices? 
 
 
4.4.2 No regional tier 
 
One major difference between the Regional Authority Index and all but one of the 
alternative seven indices is that the Regional Authority Index only captures 
intermediate regional tiers, not local government. The Regional Authority Index also 
excludes regional tiers with an average population size below 150,000 people. Six of 
the seven other indices consider local as well as regional government in assessing 
decentralization. So the Regional Authority Index is designed to measure regional 
government, and this, one would expect, is somewhat conceptually distinct from 
decentralization, which the other indices measure.  
It seems reasonable, then, to expect negative residuals for countries which have 
only one subnational government tier, which are countries with local government 
only. That is to say, the Regional Authority Index should under–estimate 
decentralization in countries that have only a local tier.  
 
 
4.4.3 Federal versus non–federal countries 
 
The fine–grained character of the Regional Authority Index allows for capturing 
graduations in the extent of regional autonomy—even in countries with highly 
autonomous regions, such as federal countries. This is different from most indices, 
which usually employ a sharply discontinuous measure, sometimes simply 
dichotomous, that distinguishes federal from non–federal countries. Lijphart, for 
example, assigns all federal countries a score of 5 whereas only Austria scores a 4.5. 
All federal countries, except Austria, thus receive the highest score while non–
federal countries are allowed to have more differentiated scores (between 1, 2, and 
3).  
The Regional Authority Index is more sensitive to variation within the federal 
category: the range among federal countries is 14, from about 17 (Austria and the 
Russian Federation) to almost 30 (Germany) up to about 31 (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). This range is about the same as it is for non–federal countries which 
vary between 0 (multiple countries) to about 14 (the Netherlands and Sweden).  
                                                 
18 The approach is similar to the one developed by Marks, Hooghe, Steenbergen and Bakker (2007) in 
cross–validating several measures of party positioning.  
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Other indices, however, work exactly the opposite way: they tend to treat the 
non–federal countries more as a homogenous group and allow more variation among 
the federal countries. Treisman’s measure, for example, gives only six out of 33 
non–federal countries a score higher than zero, whereas all eight federal countries 
score between 1 and 3.  
Differential sensitivity in measurement should produce systematic differences in 
scoring. That is to say, for some indices, such as Lijphart’s, one would expect the 
residuals with the Regional Authority Index to be larger for federal countries than 
for non–federal countries. Conversely, for other indices such as Treisman’s, the 
residuals should be smaller for federal countries and larger for non–federal ones.  
These different biases in scoring become apparent when one compares, for each 
index, means, standard deviations and ranges for federal with those for non–federal 
countries (see table 4.2). All decentralization indices are able to differentiate 
between federal and non–federal countries, i.e. the mean score for non–federal 
countries is significantly different from the mean for federal countries. This means 
that all decentralization indices pick up between–group differences.  
But not all measures are equally suited to capture within–group differences. The 
ratio measure in table 4.2 gives a sense of this. The ratio is calculated by dividing 
the standard deviation of federal countries by that of non–federal countries. A ratio 
larger than one indicates that the decentralization index is biased to capturing 
variation among federal countries, a ratio smaller than one indicates the opposite. 
One can see that the Regional Authority Index, Arzaghi and Henderson and 
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge differentiate equally between countries within each 
group. Hooghe and Marks and Lijphart tend to treat the federal countries as a 
homogenous group whereas Brancati, Lane and Ersson and Treisman tend to treat 
non–federal countries as a homogenous group.  
One may expect differences in scoring to lead to negative residuals 
(underestimation by the Regional Authority Index) for federal countries for the 
Hooghe and Marks and Lijphart measures whereas it should lead to positive 
residuals (overestimation by the Regional Authority Index) for federal countries for 
the Brancati, Lane and Ersson and Treisman measures.  
 
 
 
4.4.4 Asymmetry and regionalizing 
 
A last source of disagreement might be expected for countries that, for some reason 
or another, are complicated to evaluate. This may be so when a country has 
asymmetrical regions which depart from the general country pattern, or when 
decentralization in a country has been in flux recently. The vertical state structure is 
not necessarily uniform within a single country at a certain point in time and across 
time. A country might have a special autonomous region which has more autonomy 
than other subnational units, for example Grønland and the Færøerne in Denmark 
and Åland in Finland. There might also be differences between units of the same 
subnational tier. Examples are the historic communities versus the other autónomas 
communidades in Spain and the special statute regions versus the ordinary regions in 
Italy.  
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Decentralization is a moving target. Subnational tiers may be created or 
abolished, autonomy may be deepened or revoked. In France, for example, the 
régions were institutionalized in 1964 and across time were granted more autonomy. 
How scholars evaluate these differences at a certain point in time may differ, and 
this, one would expect, should lead to variation in scoring. 
 
 
4.4.5 Explaining disagreement 
 
Testing these expectations requires that disagreement is operationalized. I use as 
measure the residuals from regressing the Regional Authority Index on the other 
decentralization indices.  
The first two sources of disagreement—presence or absence of a regional tier 
and federal or non–federal—are operationalized as dummy variables.19 To measure 
asymmetry and dynamic regionalization, I construct an additive index (0–2), 
whereby I allocate a value of 1 to a country that has (had) asymmetric regions20, and 
a value of 1 to a the country that has experienced radical regionalization21 in the 
post–Second World War period. The Regional Authority Index is regressed on the 
decentralization indices and the residuals are subsequently regressed on the sources 
of disagreement variables.22 I begin by considering absolute residuals and than look 
at raw residuals (taking the sign into account).  
The absolute residual analysis in table 4.3 shows that the sources of 
disagreement differ across decentralization indices. The strongest predictor of 
disagreement for Brancati and Treisman is the ‘no regional tier’ variable. The 
federal–non federal variable is effective in explaining disagreement with the 
Treisman index and the asymmetry/regionalized variable explains disagreement with 
the Lijphart variable. None of the factors appeared significantly associated with the  
                                                 
19 No regional tier: whether the country has a regional tier or not (0 = country has a regional tier; 1 = 
country has no regional tier, i.e. Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, and 
Slovenia). Federal–non federal: whether the country has been a federal or non–federal country for the 
largest part of the post–Second World War period (since becoming democratic) (0 = non–federal country; 
1 = federal country, i.e. Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Germany, Russian 
Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Switzerland and the United States).  
20 Countries which scored one point: Australia (Territories versus States), Belgium (gemeenschappen 
versus gewesten), Canada (territories versus provinces), Denmark (Færøerne and Grønland versus 
amter), Finland (Åland), Italy (regioni a statuto speciale versus regioni a statuto ordinare), Portugal 
(Açores and Madeira), Spain (Ceuta and Mellila; historic autónomas comunidades versus the other 
comunidades), United Kingdom (Northern Ireland, London Regional Authority, Scotland and Wales 
versus Regions) and the United States (Alaska, Hawaii and Washington D.C. versus states). 
21 The cut–off point of having regionalized is to have had an absolute cumulative change of at least 10 in 
the Regional Authority Index country score over the post–Second World War period. The following 
countries meet this criterion: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Since most changes 
involve more autonomy, I call this variable ‘regionalized’, though for the United Kingdom there are 
almost as many negative as positive changes (because of the suspension of the parliament of Northern 
Ireland and the abolishment of the counties in Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and parts of England). 
This does not need to concern us since the variable should indicate whether there is difference cross–
sectionally and acroess time. Differences increase the likelihood of disagreement.  
22 The Pearson correlations between the sources of disagreement and between the residuals of the 
different decentralization indices are given in appendix 4.1 (tables 4.1B and 4.1C). 
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residuals for Arzaghi and Henderson, Hooghe and Marks, Lane and Ersson, and 
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge.  
I repeat the same analysis for raw residuals and report the results in table 4.4. 
The most striking result is that all beta–coefficients are negative for the ‘no regional 
tier’ variable which means that the Regional Authority Index systematically 
underestimates subnational autonomy of countries which have no regional tier.  
 
 
4.4.6 Cases of disagreement 
 
It is not only interesting to see what the sources of disagreement are but also whether 
disagreement is caused by certain countries. What are the outliers? I define a ‘case 
of disagreement’ as having a residual score of two standard deviations or more. 
Table 4.5 shows thirteen cases of disagreement involving nine countries.  
The differences in scoring for Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg and Macedonia can 
be explained by the fact that the Regional Authority Index does not measure local 
government while the other decentralization indices do. But the precise scoring of 
these cases still raises some questions.  
Cyprus and Luxembourg score 1 (out of 3) on the Treisman measure since the 
constitution of these countries reserves to subnational legislatures the exclusive right 
to legislate in at least one specific policy area. For Luxembourg this is birth, 
marriage, and death certificates23 and for Cyprus it is town planning.24 This kind of 
scoring leads to some curious bedfellows: Australia and Russia also score 1 on 
Treisman’s index, and yet it would be difficult to sustain that the states of Australia 
and the federacii subwekty in the Russian Federation have the same autonomy as the 
municipalities in Cyprus and Luxembourg. Treisman’s index, then, may not be 
discriminatory enough to tap the full range of variation in decentralization.  
A similar observation could be made for the Macedonian score on Brancati’s 
index. Macedonia scores 3 out of 5, because local governments have authority over 
taxation (+1) and education (+1) and they have an elected assembly (+1). However, 
the 1995 Law on self–government strongly curtailed these powers as Brancati notes 
herself.25 Macedonia’s score of 3 ranks on par with the regioni in Italy, the 
autónomas communidades in Spain, the Australian states, the Russian federal 
subjects and the Belgian gemeenschappen/gewesten.  
Woldendorp, Keman and Budge give Macedonia a score of 4 (out of 7). The 
score reflects that local government is mentioned in the constitution in combination 
with independent rights and its own representative body (+2 points) and that fiscal 
centralization is lower than 75% (+2 points). The latter part of the scoring is 
contested by several more recent studies which highlight the limited tax autonomy 
of Macedonian local governments. Woldendorp, Keman and Budge measure fiscal 
centralization as “Central Government Revenues as a % of General Government” 
(2000: 32–38) which is for Macedonia 44% (meaning that the local governments 
collect 66% of general government revenue). Financial governmental data for 
Macedonia is hard to find but the new Law on Local Government Finance (2002) 
                                                 
23 Art. 108 (dataset from Treisman). 
24 Art. 176 (dataset from Treisman). 
25 Data provided by Brancati (pers. comm.).  
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Table 4.5: Cases of disagreement between the Regional 
Authority Index and seven decentralization indices 
Country Sign Decentralization Index 
Belgium + Brancati (2006) 
Belgium + Hooghe and Marks (2001) 
Cyprus – Brancati (2006) 
Cyprus – Treisman (2002) 
Finland – Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) 
Germany + Brancati (2006) 
Germany + Lane and Ersson (1999) 
Luxembourg – Treisman (2002) 
Macedonia – Brancati (2006) 
Macedonia – Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) 
Poland – Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) 
Serbia and Montenegro + Brancati (2006) 
Sweden + Hooghe and Marks (2001) 
Notes: A case of disagreement is defined as having a residual of above two standard 
deviations. The sign of the residual is also given. A positive sign signifies 
overestimation and a negative sign signifies underestimation of the Regional 
Authority Index. There are no cases of disagreement between the Regional Authority 
Index and Lijphart’s (1999) measure. 
 
assigns the levy of various taxes on property to local government units together with 
3% of the personal income tax and access to an equalisation fund equal to 3% of 
value added taxes (Davey 2004). Local governments share in government 
expenditures as a percentage of general government expenditures was 7% in 2003 
(Davey 2004). In light of this data the scoring of Macedonia by Woldendorp, Keman 
and Budge is questionable for the post–2000 period but appears plausible for the 
1991–1998 period (but see Todorovski 2001 for the late 1990s).  
The higher score for Finland for Woldendorp, Keman and Budge has to do with 
the fact that the Regional Authority Index does not measure local government. 
Finland scores high on subnational autonomy, a component of the Woldendorp, 
Keman and Budge measure, which brings it on par with the Scandinavian as well as 
with the federal countries. Unlike its Scandinavian neighbors, Finland had no 
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significant regional (or county) level of government before 1993, which is why the 
Regional Authority Index underestimates decentralization in Finland but not in the 
other Scandinavian countries.  
A case where the source of disagreement lies in a different definition of the 
boundaries of the country is Serbia and Montenegro which is scored relatively lower 
on decentralization by Brancati than the Regional Authority Index. The main reason, 
it appears, is that Brancati focuses primarily on Serbia during 1985–2000, while the 
Regional Authority Index considers Serbia and Montenegro as a unit.26  
Three cases of disagreement concern differences in whether particular tiers are 
included or excluded.  
The first is Belgium, which Hooghe and Marks give a lower score than the 
Regional Authority Index in 1970 and in 1990. The main reason for this 
disagreement is that Hooghe and Marks focused on one government tier—the most 
autonomous tier at a given time point—rather than on all intermediate tiers. In 1970, 
the most autonomous tier consisted of the provinces, and by 1990—their next time 
point—it was the communities. The Regional Authority Index, on the other hand, 
evaluates all intermediate tiers of government present at any time point. Belgium is 
also a case of disagreement with the Brancati measure. The main reason is that 
Brancati also focused on one tier of government, namely the regions/communities 
but not the provinces. This results in a lower scoring by Brancati. 
A third case of divergence, also with the Hooghe and Marks measure, is Sweden 
which is scored higher by the Regional Authority Index in 1950 and 1970. Hooghe 
and Marks consider the county governments in the Scandinavian countries as local 
and do not include them because their measure concerns regional autonomy. Hooghe 
and Marks therefore do not include the län in Sweden whereas the Regional 
Authority Index does27, resulting in a lower scoring by Hooghe and Marks. 
The remaining disagreements cannot be reduced to the local government factor, 
to country definition or to inclusion/exclusion of particular tiers.  
A first and second case of divergence is Germany, which Lane and Ersson and 
Brancati score significantly lower on decentralization than the Regional Authority 
Index. Lane and Ersson give Germany 4 (out of 10), which places Germany at the 
same level as Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. The main reason for this is 
Lane and Ersson’s unusually expansive operationalization of decentralization: not 
only does it include local governance (+3 for Denmark and Finland), but also 
functional, neo–corporatist autonomy (+2 for the Netherlands).  
Brancati scores Germany 3 (out of 5) as she estimates that the Länder do not 
have control over public order/police (–1) and constitutional amendments do not 
require Länder approval (–1). Both coding decisions are contestable. Public 
order/police is actually a concurrent power (Watts 1999; Swenden 2006; and 
appendix 3.1). On constitutional change, Länder approval of constitutional 
amendments is indispensable due to their dominance in the Bundesrat (appendix 
                                                 
26 The other decentralization indexes do not include Yugoslavia and/or Serbia and Montenegro for the 
time period in question. 
27 The upper chamber with län representation was abolished in 1971 and the Regional Authority Index 
score decreases for subsequent time periods. Therefore the time points 1990 and 2000 do not lead to a 
case of disagreement. 
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3.1). Brancati does not measure shared power exercised via an upper chamber but 
the Regional Authority Index does.  
Another case of disagreement with the Brancati measure concerns Cyprus. 
Brancati scores Cyprus 3 out of 5, while the Regional Authority Index scores it 0. 
The disagreement lies in the operationalization of decentralization. Closer 
examination shows that Brancati includes consociational arrangements laid down in 
the Constitution which decentralize authority to the Greek and Turkish Communities 
while the Regional Authority Index excludes decentralization to non–territorial 
actors.  
A fourth and final case of disagreement is Poland which Arzaghi and Henderson 
score higher than the Regional Authority Index. The difference in opinion appears to 
be whether the central government has the ability to suspend or to override 
subnational decisions. According to Arzaghi and Henderson, the answer is no, and 
so Poland receives a score of 4 instead of 0 for this sub–indicator. The scoring of 
Poland seems to be incorrect. The highest regional tier, the wojedwództwa, have 
gained directly elected councils and more autonomy since the end of communism, 
but their decisions are still subject to central sanctioning (Council of Europe 2000: 
47–48 and Kowalczyk 2000: 228; appendix 3.1). Central control is even greater for 
the lower regional tier, powiaty, and for local government, the gminy, for which the 
central government has the right to override decisions and has the authority to 
suspend the councils (Council of Europe 2000: 46–51; Glowacki 2002: 113–114; 
Okraszewska and Kwiatkowski 2002: 201–202; Kowalczyk 2000: 222–228). 
 
 
4.5  Content validity of fiscal indicators 
 
Fiscal indicators are widely employed as an overall measure of decentralization (see 
for example Braun 2000b; Castles 1999; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Lane and Ersson 
1999; Oates 1972; and Stegarescu 2005b). These indicators are based upon two 
extensively used sources: the Governance Finance Statistics database by the 
International Monetary Fund and Historical and/or National Accounts and/or 
Revenue Statistics of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Many different operationalizations exist but the most broadly used 
operationalizations are the following:  
 
a.  subnational share of total government expenditures;  
b.  intergovernmental grant share (i.e. grants from higher tier 
 governments) as a percentage of total subnational revenue; 
c.  subnational own revenue (i.e. revenues from taxes plus fees and levies)  
 as a percentage of total subnational revenue; 
d.  subnational tax revenue share as a percentage of total subnational  
 revenue; 
e.  subnational tax revenue share as a percentage of total government tax 
 revenue. 
 
One can categorize the different operationalizations in two broad classes: 
expenditure (a and b) and revenue (c, d and e) aggregate fiscal indicators. Both 
classes of fiscal indicators raise two main caveats/problems with respect to content 
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validity. First of all, fiscal indicators do not differentiate very well between 
decision–making authority and the authority to implement28 and, therefore, cannot 
be used to measure subnational decision–making authority. The second caveat is that 
fiscal indicators do not measure effectively differences in subnational 
implementation powers. 
 
Caveat 1: Expenditure and revenue fiscal indicators fail to capture how much 
decision–making authority subnational governments have and do not differentiate 
between decision–making and implementation. 
 
To exemplify this caveat one may differentiate between regulatory policies and 
policies involving the direct expenditure of public funds (Majone 1994). This 
distinction helps us to tell apart policies with a direct bearing on the public budget, 
for example welfare state policies, from policies that are not expensive for 
government budgets but have considerable impact on society through the rules they 
impose, for example civil and criminal law. While the cost of expenditure 
programmes is borne by the public budget, the cost of most regulatory policies is 
borne by citizens and firms (Majone 1994).  
To the extent that regions have control over regulatory policies, expenditure 
fiscal indicators would tell us nothing about decentralization. Imagine two countries, 
one in which subnational governments have the authority to implement expenditure 
policies (country A) and one in which subnational governments have authority 
regarding regulatory policies (country B). An expenditure fiscal indicator will score 
country A higher than country B on subnational decentralization. However, it would 
be wrong to conclude that country A is more decentralized than country B or that 
subnational governments in country A are more autonomous than those in country 
B. In fact, subnational governments in country B might have much more autonomy 
than those in country A since regulatory policies have the capacity to affect society 
deeply.  
Fiscal indicators on the expenditure side are particularly problematic for 
capturing decision–making decentralization, since it does not tell us whether the 
expenditure comes from conditional or unconditional grants, whether the central 
government determines how the money should be spent, whether it sets the 
framework legislation within which subnational governments implement, or 
whether–—indeed–—subnational governments spend the money autonomously 
(Akai and Sakata 2002; Breuss and Eller 2004; Ebel and Yilmaz 2002; Fisman and 
Gatti 2002; Panizza 1999; Sharma 2006).  
The argument can be shown empirically in a scatter plot of the Regional 
Authority Index against the subnational share of total government expenditure (see 
figure 4.1). Subnational governments in Scandinavian countries have the same (or 
higher) shares of total government expenditures than their peers in federal countries. 
To conclude from this that Scandinavian countries are as decentralized as federal 
                                                 
28 The distinction between the authority to decide and the authority to implement is based upon Braun’s 
(2000b) ‘Right to Decide’ and ‘Right to Act’ respectively. “The Right to Decide refers to who may decide 
what will be done (policy formulation and decision–making). The Right to Act refers to who may decide 
on how it will be done (policy implementation)” (Braun 2000b: 29; original italics). 
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Figure 4.1: Subnational expenditure share as a percentage of total 
government expenditures plotted against scores on the Regional Authority 
Index (averages for 1972–2001) 
 
Notes: The Pearson correlation between the two measures is 0.459 (p < 0.01; N = 35). Source: World 
Bank (2006). 
 
countries would be wrong. Subnational governments in Scandinavian countries have 
less decision–making authority over policies, less taxation power, and they do not 
enjoy power sharing.29 The national government decides policies and local and 
regional governments implement them (Rodden 2004).  
One could ‘correct’ the indicator for subnational share by looking at the share of 
intergovernmental grants (Akai and Sakata 2002; Breus and Eller 2004; Oates 1972; 
Stegarescu 2005b). This indicator measures the amount of central government 
involvement in subnational provision of policies. Often a distinction is made 
between conditional (specific) and unconditional (general) grants, whereby it is 
generally assumed that central government involvement is higher with conditional 
grants as a conditional grant ties expenditure to particular strings (conditions) 
imposed by the central government (Shah 2007). But taking the intergovernmental 
grants into account does not solve the problem. Aside from data availability 
regarding unconditional and conditional grants (Rodden 2004), there is the problem 
that intergovernmental grants do not seem to differentiate between federal and non–
federal countries (see figure 4.2), as an one–way Anova analysis as regards to 
average (1972–2001) subnational intergovernmental grant share as a percentage of 
total subnational revenue bears out (N = 35; F: 0.50; p = 0.482)30.  
                                                 
29 Sweden counties (län) were represented in an upper chamber before the 1971 parliamentary reform. 
The data reflect the 1972−2001 period.  
30 The following countries were considered to be federal Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
Russia, Spain, Switzerland and the United States of America. Excluding Belgium and Spain from the 
federal group does not lead to different conclusions (oneway ANOVA analysis: N = 35; F: 1.85, p = 
0.182). 
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Figure 4.2: Intergovernmental grant share as a percentage of total 
subnational government revenue plotted against scores on the Regional 
Authority Index (averages for 1972–2001) 
 
Notes: The Pearson correlation between the two measures is 0.034 (not significant; N = 36). Source: 
World Bank (2006). 
 
Fiscal indicators on the revenue side are not biased against direct expenditure or 
regulatory policies. But they generate their own problems of concept validity. 
Revenue fiscal indicators do not help us figure out whether authorities that can tax 
autonomously can also decide autonomously what to do with the money (Ebel and 
Yilmaz 2002; Marlow 1988; Martinez–Vazquez and McNab 1997; Panizza 1999).  
While the revenue might be collected freely, it may have to be spent on policies 
laid down by the central government. There is no direct, theoretical or empirical, 
link between the authority to collect revenues and the authority to decide and 
implement policies. 
This is apparent in figure 4.3 which plots the average Regional Authority Index 
score for 1972–2001 against the subnational tax revenue as a percentage of total 
government tax revenue (averages for 1972–2001). The correlation is moderate and 
significant (Pearson r = 0.47, p < 0.01, N = 36). But a closer look at individual 
countries reveals that Sweden and Denmark are ranked at the same level as the USA 
and, to a lesser extent, the Russian federation and Switzerland, all three of which are 
federations. The counties in Denmark and Sweden may set the rate of income tax 
within central government parameters (appendix 3.1). But it would be wrong to 
conclude that the subnational tiers in Sweden and Denmark have the same policy 
and institutional autonomy as their peers in the USA, the Russian federation and 
Switzerland.  
The fundamental difference between the subnational tiers in Sweden and 
Denmark and the constituent units in federal countries is that the central government 
retains full decision–making rights regarding tax powers in the former—and can 
unilaterally change the rules if and whenever it so desires—while it is 
constitutionally bound to respect regional tax powers in the USA, Switzerland, and 
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Figure 4.3: Subnational tax revenue share as a percentage of total government 
tax revenue plotted against scores on the Regional Authority Index (averages 
for 1972–2001) 
 
Notes: The Pearson correlation between the two measures is 0.472 (p < 0.01; N = 36). Source: World 
Bank (2006). 
 
arguably even in semi–democratic Russia. Moreover, regional authorities in Sweden 
and Denmark have primarily administrative powers over a broad range of policies 
within a national legislative framework. In the USA, Switzerland and the Russian 
Federation subnational tiers have principal authority over a swathe of policies.31 
 
Caveat 2: Fiscal indicators do not necessarily measure differences in 
implementation authority.  
 
There are two reasons. First, one cannot differentiate whether observed 
differences in fiscal centralization are due to genuine decentralization or whether 
they reflect differences in political economy. The argumentation is given by Oates 
(1972: 199–200):  
 
“… even if there exists an identical allocation of functions among levels of government across two 
countries, their centralization ratios will generally differ if they do not have the same relative expenditure 
patterns on these functions. A country, for example, with an unusually large portion of its resources 
devoted to national defense will have, other things being equal, a relatively high degree of fiscal 
centralization. …. centralization ratios may differ because certain services provided publicly in one 
economy are provided in the private sector in another” 
 
Note that this argument applies to the Regional Authority Index too but that 
fiscal indicators, and especially direct expenditure policies, are vulnerable to this 
problem. In the Scandinavian countries, a large proportion of government 
expenditure is devoted to welfare state policies, and these are often provided by 
                                                 
31 One could extend this argument to the other countries in the dataset. 
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subnational governments. In market–liberal Anglo–Saxon countries, welfare state 
functions tend to be privatized. So a difference in political economy explains higher 
expenditure (and revenue) in Scandinavian countries than in Anglo–Saxon countries 
whereas the allocation of functions among levels of government might be identical. 
The Regional Authority Index is not wholly invulnerable to the risk of conflating 
expenditure with authority, but since it relies on legal documents to gauge the 
allocation of functions rather than fiscal data, it avoids this problem to some extent.  
Second, fiscal measures conflate whether an increase in fiscal numbers is the 
result of a shift in functions or resources between government tiers, or whether it 
simply reflects a change in the size of government activities (Stegarescu 2005a). An 
increase in fiscal decentralization might be due to a relative increase in either the 
volume or the range of public goods provided by subnational governments. In the 
former, authority has not increased; in the latter, it has. Imagine a country in which a 
subnational government provides unemployment benefits. If the following year the 
subnational government provides sickness pay as well as unemployment benefits, 
there will have been an increase in authority. This will coincide, presumably, with 
an increase in subnational expenditure share and/or in an increase in subnational tax 
share (to finance the increased expenditure). However, subnational expenditure (or 
revenue) could also have increased without an expansion of authority, for example, 
if unemployment had increased.  
 
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 
A comparison of the Regional Authority Index with seven decentralization indices in 
the literature shows a great amount of agreement. A single underlying factor 
accounts for about three–quarters of the variance. This is remarkable given the 
diverse ways of operationalizing a fluid concept such as decentralization.  
An analysis of residuals (by regressing the Regional Authority Index on the 
seven decentralization indices) shows that the most consistent source of 
disagreement comes from the fact that the Regional Authority Index focuses on 
regional government to the exclusion of local government, while most 
decentralization indices include local government. A second source of difference 
relates to the sophistication of the measures. The more fine–grained Regional 
Authority Index is able to capture greater variation among both federal and unitary 
countries than most decentralization indices. Finally, countries–on–the–move, which 
have undergone major regionalization/federalization in the post–Second World War 
period, and countries with asymmetrical regions tend to generate more diverse 
scores differ across decentralization indexes than countries with greater architectural 
stability.  
Finally, an analysis of the content validity of fiscal indicators examined the 
shortcomings of fiscal indicators as a measurement of subnational authority or 
decentralization. Two caveats were considered. First, fiscal indicators fail to capture 
whether subnational governments can decide autonomously what to do with the 
money. Second, we cannot tell whether differences in fiscal decentralization is due 
to genuine political decentralization or due to differences in political economy 
and/or a change in the size of government activities. Their value as a proxy for 
decentralization appears therefore limited. 
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